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1  | INTRODUC TION
There are many instances in which leaders’ dishonesty, unfairness, 
corruption, or immorality are at the centre of the public agenda 
(Hoyt et al., 2013; Kellerman, 2004). Even though such behavior 
is regarded as unambiguously “bad” (Abrams et al., 2013), follow-
ers do not always perceive these leaders that clearly transgress im-
portant norms as undesirable or harmful to the group. For instance, 
research has shown that these leaders have more leeway to devi-
ate from norms when they have accumulated idiosyncratic credits 
(Hollander, 1958, 1992, 2006), are prototypical (e.g., Hogg, 2001; van 
Knippenberg, 2011), or have been recently appointed and endowed 
with the conferral to lead (Abrams et al., 2008, 2018). However, 
there is less research accounting for the situations where groups 
actually reject immoral and harmful actions from their leaders (e.g., 
Abrams et al., 2014; Karelaia & Keck, 2013). As such, there is a gap in 
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Abstract
Research on the transgression credit shows that groups may sometimes turn a blind 
eye to ingroup leaders who transgress moral norms. Although there is substantial 
research investigating the underlying criteria of what makes a “good” leader, research 
often neglects to investigate the role of followers in leader- group dynamics. In this 
paper, we offer a novel approach to transgressive leadership by proposing that leader 
legitimacy is a key factor that determines whether followers’ reactions to transgres-
sive leaders are positive or negative. Across two experiments, participants ascribed 
transgression credit only to transgressive ingroup leaders perceived as legitimate 
(Studies 1– 2, total n = 308). Transgressive illegitimate leaders were viewed as more 
threatening to the group, were targeted for formal punishment, received less valida-
tion for their behavior, triggered negative emotions (anger and shame), and raised 
higher consensus for their removal from the leadership position than did legitimate 
leaders. This effect also occurred irrespective of the absence of formal social control 
measures implemented toward the transgressive leader (Study 2). Mediation analy-
sis showed that leader illegitimacy triggered stronger feelings of group threat and 
stronger negative emotions which, consequently, fuelled agreement with collective 
protest against the transgressive leader. Theoretical and practical implications of 
these findings are discussed.
K E Y W O R D S
collective protest, group dynamics, leader legitimacy, leadership, social control, transgression 
credit, transgressive leaders
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understanding which processes drive groups to accept versus punish 
their own transgressive leaders. In this paper, we report two studies 
testing the hypothesis that leader legitimacy shapes followers’ per-
ceptions of leader transgressions which, in turn, affect the accep-
tance versus punishment of transgressive leaders.
1.1 | Transgressive leadership
Transgressive leadership is perceived as morally questionable be-
havior that goes beyond mere opinion deviance, which may involve 
breaking laws or rules within a common social context (Abrams 
et al., 2013). These transgressions can be perceived to be driven 
by leaders’ selfish, dishonest, or discriminatory attitudes (Kim 
et al., 2006; Mayer et al., 1995). However, whereas followers are usu-
ally punished for adopting similar behavior, ingroup leaders are often 
exempt from the same punishment (Abrams et al., 2013). Indeed, re-
search on the transgression credit demonstrated that transgressive 
ingroup leaders tend to be treated leniently compared to similarly 
transgressive outgroup leaders and ingroup or outgroup regular 
members (Abrams et al., 2013; Randsley de Moura & Abrams, 2013). 
Considering that leaders usually embody the group prototype (e.g., 
Hogg, 2001; Hogg et al., 1998, 2012), a negative reaction toward 
ingroup leaders could be perceived as a negative reaction toward 
the group itself. In this sense, tolerating an ingroup leader’s trans-
gression may be seen as an act of group loyalty (Abrams et al., 2013).
This is not always the case. For example, transgressive ingroup 
leaders are depreciated when they are perceived to threaten mem-
bers’ social identity (Abrams et al., 2014). This might be because 
disruptions in leadership, like challenges or violations of the group’s 
values, can reflect a flaw of the group itself and threaten the group’s 
identity (Balser & Carmin, 2009). These feelings of threat can elicit 
hostile emotions, like anger (Lerner et al., 2003; Sadler et al., 2005), 
subsequently fuelling spontaneous and impulsive aggressive behav-
iors (van Stekelenburg et al., 2011). This suggests that followers can 
sometimes perceive transgressive ingroup leaders as threatening to 
their group, which may elicit derogatory and punitive reactions from 
the group. However, it is not yet clear what leads followers to feel 
threatened by transgressive leaders as opposed to tolerating their 
transgression. Based on previous evidence highlighting the impor-
tance of leader legitimacy on leader evaluation and endorsement, 
we propose that leader legitimacy will function as an important 
boundary condition for understanding how and when transgressive 
ingroup leaders pose a threat to the group.
1.2 | Leader legitimacy
Legitimacy is a psychological attribute that allows leaders to gather 
the support of followers, because their power is seen as both de-
served and justified (Caddick, 1982; Tyler, 2006). This attribute con-
stitutes the basis for leader selection in democratic systems (e.g., 
election of political leaders), and it is ultimately linked with leaders’ 
standing with their followers (Bass & Bass, 2009). Some have ini-
tially argued that the process of legitimacy begins with the form of 
ascension to the leadership role, as elected leaders generally cre-
ate higher expectations than appointed leaders (Julian et al., 1969). 
However, significant research has also shown that leaders’ legiti-
macy is acknowledged by followers through the display of trustwor-
thiness, credibility, competence, fairness, and previous task success, 
rather than by simply exercising authority (Ratcliff & Vescio, 2017; 
Tyler, 2006; Vial et al., 2016; Willis et al., 2010).
The crucial aspect of legitimacy is the underlying belief that deci-
sions made by the legitimate authorities are considered valid and en-
titled to be obeyed by virtue of the legitimate figure (Tyler, 2006). In 
this sense, legitimacy becomes a requirement for a leader’s ability to 
exert influence and power, which ultimately creates a sense of duty 
and obligation amongst followers (Levi et al., 2009). This readiness 
to accept and comply with legitimate leaders (Magee & Frasier, 2014; 
Tyler, 2002) can even overcome followers’ moral standards, such as 
when followers give leaders the power to determine what is right 
and wrong (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989). Therefore, it is possible that 
transgressive leaders escape punishment when they are legitimated 
within the group. In contrast, it is likely that followers are motivated 
to challenge illegitimate leaders’ authority and support more puni-
tive measures toward their transgressive behavior.
1.3 | Social control and collective protest
Social control is typically the act of punishing group members who 
violate important social or group- specific norms (e.g., ingroup devi-
ants), which can be a major way for a group to control and attenuate 
the potential damage caused to the group, and to reinforce adherence 
to social norms (Erikson, 1964; Gibbs, 1977; Levine, 1989; Marques 
et al., 2001; van Prooijen, 2018). However, when the group’s social 
control mechanisms are perceived to be ineffective, group members 
shift to participation and endorsement of non- normative collec-
tive actions– informal measures to control or punish the offenders, 
often using unconventional means (Campos et al., 2017; Tausch 
et al., 2011). Such informal social control actions can range from par-
ticipation in peaceful collective demonstrations to participation in 
civil disorder (Becker & Tausch, 2015; Tausch et al., 2011). They can 
also encompass intense informal punitive reactions aimed at com-
pensating for the sources’ inability to ensure or restore a perceived 
state of justice (Strelan & van Prooijen, 2013).
Collective protest is a form of collective action in which highly 
identified group members engage when they perceive their group to 
be a target of social injustice (Abrams & Randsley de Moura, 2002; 
Klandermans et al., 2002). Contrasting with normative collective 
actions that aim to protect and reinforce social norms, nonnor-
mative actions exist to threaten the existing social order (Wright 
et al., 1990). These nonnormative actions are strongly predicted by 
negative emotions, such as: (1) anger, as it induces a tendency to pun-
ish people who violate norms (Smith & Kessler, 2004; Van Zomeren 
et al., 2004), and (2) shame, as the transgression could reflect a flaw in 
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the group’s identity (Lickel et al., 2005). In this sense, such emotions 
function as accelerators or amplifiers of protest (van Stekelenburg 
& Klandermans, 2017), connected to the goal of challenging and 
confronting targets responsible for injustice (Frijda et al., 1989). As 
such, group members then express their anger and shame directed 
at leaders who violate the group’s shared beliefs and values by pro-
testing against these leaders (van Stekelenburg et al., 2011; see also, 
Páez et al., 2013; Stürmer & Simon, 2009; Thomas et al., 2009; Van 
Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2010). Thus, collective protest should 
reflect a group reaction through which group members demand the 
punishment of a transgressive illegitimate leader.
2  | THE PRESENT RESE ARCH
In the present research, we investigate the impact of leader legitimacy 
on group reactions to transgressive leaders. Building on the notion 
that illegitimate leaders generally obtain less support from followers 
than do legitimate leaders (Ratcliff & Vescio, 2017), we test the role of 
leader legitimacy as an important contextual boundary of transgres-
sive leadership. Specifically, we suggest that leader legitimacy should 
explain the differential outcomes between support versus rejection of 
leaders who break moral norms. In this sense, we propose that leader 
legitimacy allows for greater transgression because followers abdicate 
moral authority to their legitimate leaders. We will also test how fol-
lowers react to (il)legitimate leaders that depending on whether they 
have been punished by the ingroup or not. We use an experimental 
vignette methodology across studies to construct organizationally rel-
evant scenarios whilst also maintaining experimental control (Aguinis 
& Bradley, 2014). First, we manipulate leader legitimacy and measure 
how threatening to the group and punishable an illegitimate versus le-
gitimate leader is (Study 1). Second, we investigate whether the pres-
ence or absence of social control (punishment measures) moderates 
the effect of leader legitimacy on the acceptance versus support for 
punishment of transgressive leaders (Study 2).
3  | STUDY 1
Previous research has suggested that ingroup leaders are given 
transgression credit, compared to ingroup regular members (i.e., 
non- leaders; Abrams et al., 2013). Study 1 tests the prediction 
that ingroup leaders are given transgression credit only when 
they are perceived as legitimate as opposed to illegitimate. Given 
that illegitimate leaders lack trust and loyalty from group members 
(Hollander, 2009), we predict that their transgressions are more 
likely to be perceived as highly threatening to the group and, there-
fore, in need of being controlled. As such, we expect participants 
to support measures of formal punishment more (i.e., higher social 
control) when judging transgressive illegitimate (versus legitimate) 
leaders. We hypothesize that transgressive illegitimate leaders will 
trigger more negative reactions (group threat and formal punish-
ment), compared to transgressive legitimate leaders.
3.1 | Method
3.1.1 | Participants and design
In order to reach a broad population, participants were recruited 
in public spaces with pen and paper questionnaires in a large city 
in mainland Portugal. The sample consisted of 116 Portuguese re-
spondents (42 men, 65 women, and 9 who did not report gender), 
aged from 18 to 69 years old (M = 25.84; SD = 10.12). A Post hoc 
power analysis with α = 0.05 revealed that this sample size af-
forded approximately 80% power to detect effect sizes of r = 0.25 
(G*Power; Faul et al., 2007) for the main effect of leader legitimacy 
on the dependent variables. The experiment was a Legitimate versus 
Illegitimate between- participants design.
3.1.2 | Procedure
A positive social group identity is a necessary condition for the 
transgression credit (Abrams et al., 2013; Travaglino et al., 2015), 
thus implying that we require a highly salient group to test our 
hypothesis. For this purpose, we created a scenario in a national 
(Portuguese) context and we started the study by measuring par-
ticipants’ national identification. Then, participants were presented 
with the scenario of a transgressive leader from a public national 
level organization, which included the Leader Legitimacy manipula-
tion, presented through a piece of (fictitious) news. Participants read 
about a Portuguese leader, “Vítor Almeida,” of a Portuguese public- 
private venture (an organization that was ostensibly part of the 
Ministry of Health) who was managing the construction of a hospital 
that would cover a significant part of Portugal with implications on 
the country's health system. This information was designed to make 
the Portuguese national identity salient and ensure that participants 
engaged with the scenario, by perceiving the organization’s goals as 
relevant to the ingroup. The scenario was followed by measures of 
perceived legitimacy, group threat, and formal punishment.
3.1.3 | Leader legitimacy manipulation
The Leader Legitimacy manipulation was based on whether the group 
elected the leader or whether the leader was nominated (adapted 
from Julian et al., 1969), alongside attributes known to endow lead-
ers with legitimacy, such as perceived competence, trustworthiness, 
and previous task success (e.g., Hollander, 2006).
3.1.4 | Legitimate condition
Vítor Almeida is the current President responsible for the project “More 
and Better Health” of the partnership between the Ministry of Health 
and the Hospital of Tomar, role he obtained through election by absolute 
majority from his partners and workers.
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We collected opinions among the workers and partners of this organi-
zation about Vítor Almeida and they seem highly expectant about his per-
formance. According to his business partners, “The choice of Vítor Almeida 
represents a strong commitment on our part” and “We believe that this 
partnership will be successful.” Similarly, his employees commented that 
“He has our trust (…) the president seems to make understandable and rea-
sonable decisions” and that “We know the past record of President Vítor 
Almeida and we know that we can count on him.”
3.1.5 | Illegitimate condition
Vítor Almeida is the current President responsible for the project “More 
and better health” of the partnership between the Ministry of Health 
and the Hospital of Tomar, role he obtained through appointment by the 
government.
We collected opinions among the workers and partners of this orga-
nization about Vítor Almeida and they seem uncertain about his perfor-
mance. According to his business partners, “Vítor Almeida’s appointment 
was not our choice, it was a Government decision” and that “We do not 
believe this partnership will succeed.” Similarly, his employees commented 
that “He does not have our support (…) the president seems to make dis-
concerting and unreasonable decisions,” and that “We don’t know the past 
record of President Vítor Almeida or even that much about him.”
3.1.6 | Leader transgression induction
Following the Leader Legitimacy manipulation, participants learned 
of some of the leader’s transgressions, specifically the way he ig-
nored a few safety measures to spare time and how he made reduc-
tions to employees’ wages in order to compensate for the costs of 
the construction of the hospital.1
3.2 | Control measures/manipulation check
3.2.1 | National identification
National identification was measured by the following items 
(adapted from Abrams et al., 1998) (1 = Completely disagree; 
7 = Completely agree): (1) “Being Portuguese is important to 
 define who I am”; (2) “Portuguese citizens are valuable people”; 
(3) “I am glad to have been born in Portugal”; (4) “I am proud to be 
Portuguese.” We used a mean score of the items (Cronbach’s α = 
0.83).
3.2.2 | Perceived legitimacy (Manipulation check)
Participants were asked to judge leader legitimacy on four bipolar 
items: “I believe that Vítor Almeida is”: (1 = Untrustworthy, Illegitimate, 
Not credible, Not Acknowledged; 7 = Trustworthy, Legitimate, Credible, 




Participants gave their opinion about the threatening character of 
the transgressive leader to the group in three items (1 = Completely 
disagree; 7 = Completely agree): (1) “This individual jeopardizes the 
country”; (2) “These situations threaten our country’s image”; (3) 
“The content of this news report undermines my confidence in the 
Portuguese political system.” We used a mean score of the items 
(Cronbach’s α = 0.84).
3.3.2 | Formal punishment
Participants gave their agreement on several possible puni-
tive reactions that the group could implement toward the target 
(1 = Completely disagree; 7 = Completely agree): (1) “Vítor Almeida 
should maintain his role of President in the project” (reversed); 
(2) “Authorities should carry out an audit of the activities of the 
President and the accounts of the company”; (3) “Authorities should 
initiate a disciplinary procedure to Vítor Almeida”; (4) “Vítor Almeida 
should be demoted and become an integrated member without ex-
erting management decisions”; (5) “Vítor Almeida should be fired”; (6) 
“Authorities should open a judicial inquiry regarding Vítor Almeida.” 
A Principal Components Factor Analysis with Varimax rotation 
showed that the six items saturated on a single factor explaining 
53.63% of variance. We used a mean score of the items (Cronbach’s 
α = 0.82).
4  | RESULTS
Tables 1 and 2 provide descriptive statistics and correlations for 
measures in Study 1.
4.1 | Control measures/manipulation check
4.1.1 | National identification
Participants were on average highly identified with the ingroup 
(M = 5.67; SD = 1.08), as this mean was higher than the mid- point 
of the scale (4), t(115) = 16.58, p < .001. There were no a priori 
 1The leader's transgression was tested through a pilot study. Participants (N = 26) were 
asked to evaluate several actions supposedly implemented by leaders of projects related 
to PPP (Public- Private Partnerships) institutions [1 = Completely wrong; 7 = Completely 
right]. Results showed that the statements “He ignored a few safety measures to save 
time” and “He made reductions to the workers’ wages in order to compensate for the 
costs of the construction of the hospital” were the most negatively evaluated, (M = 2.15, 
DP = 1.46) and (M = 2.42, DP = 1.27), respectively. Thus, these statements were selected 
for the transgression manipulation for the experiment.
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differences in terms of national identification between experimental 
conditions, F(1,114) = 0.301, p = .584.
4.1.2 | Perceived legitimacy
An analysis of variance showed that participants perceived greater 
legitimacy in the Legitimate condition than in the Illegitimate condi-
tion, F(1,114) = 43.85, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.278, which confirms the ef-
fectiveness of the Leader Legitimacy manipulation.
4.2 | Dependent measures
4.2.1 | Group threat
As expected, an analysis of variance showed a significant effect of 
Leader Legitimacy, whereby participants perceived the transgres-
sive leader as more threatening to the group in the Illegitimate con-




As predicted, the analysis revealed a significant effect of Leader 
Legitimacy on Formal punishment, F(1,114) = 9.15, p = .003, ηp
2 = 
0.074. Specifically, participants agreed that the transgressive illegiti-
mate leader should be punished more harshly by the group than the 
transgressive legitimate leader.
5  | DISCUSSION
Results support our hypothesis that group members only accept 
transgressions from legitimate ingroup leaders. Indeed, group mem-
bers perceive transgressive illegitimate leaders to be more threat-
ening to the group and agree more with the implementation of 
formal punishment measures toward such leaders. These results 
extend previous evidence by showing that perceived leader’s (il)le-
gitimacy is a significant determinant of follower reactions to leaders 
who engage in transgression. Thus, it is possible that transgressions 
committed by legitimate leaders are more validated by followers. 
We will test this directly in Study 2. Furthermore, Study 2 also tests 
whether reactions to illegitimate transgression leaders vary accord-
ing to whether the leader has or not been formally punished by the 
group (i.e., whether mechanisms of social control are present and 
working).
6  | STUDY 2
Study 1 showed that followers warrant formal social control toward 
transgressive illegitimate leaders, as these leaders are perceived as 
more threatening to the group than legitimate ones. However, it is 
possible that participants might have assumed that the leader would 
go unpunished for their transgressions, which could be (at least partly) 
responsible for the observed feelings of threat and need for punish-
ment. Therefore, in Study 2, we address this possibility by examin-
ing whether the absence (versus presence) of clear social control 
mechanisms over the transgressive leader moderates the effects of 
leader illegitimacy on the intent to punish the transgressive leader. 
An important test to determine whether the acceptance of transgres-
sive legitimate leaders is driven by legitimacy is to consider whether 
groups will still accept those leaders’ transgressions in the absence of 
social control– that is, in threatening situations in which clear group 
mechanisms to punish a leader’s transgressions are absent. If, as we 
hypothesize, leaders are given transgression credit when they have 
gained legitimacy, then this effect should not disappear in the ab-
sence of social control. In addition to the measures used in Study 1, 
we also measure validation of the leader’s behavior, negative emo-
tions (i.e., anger and shame), and collective protest. Overall, we test 
the idea that transgressive illegitimate leaders are perceived as more 
threatening to the ingroup and thus raise more negative emotions 
among followers than legitimate leaders do, which, in turn, can trig-
ger collective protest from group members to remove such leaders 
from power. Given that perceived threat to the group elicits negative 
emotional responses (e.g., Levin et al., 2013), which, in turn, comprise 
strong predictors of engagement in nonnormative collective actions 
(Lickel et al., 2005; Van Zomeren et al., 2004), we believe that the 
negative emotions triggered by the threat of an illegitimate leader will 
predict collective protest. Therefore, we test the role of group threat 
and negative emotions as mediators (in sequence) of the relationship 
between leader legitimacy and collective protest.
1 2 3 4
Leader Legitimacy – 
National identification 0.051 – 
Perceived legitimacy 
(MC)
−0.527*** 0.082 – 
Group threat 0.375*** 0.088 −0.386*** – 
Formal punishment 0.273** 0.107 −0.482*** 0.440***
Note: *p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
Leader Legitimacy coded: Legitimate = −1; Illegitimate = 1.
TA B L E  1   Correlations between 
variables (Study 1)
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6.1 | Participants and design
A sample of U.S. citizens (N = 192, 71 men, 120 women, and 1 did not 
report gender), aged from 19 to 75 years old (M = 38.77; SD = 12.41) 
participated in this study via Amazon Mechanical Turk. A Post hoc 
power analysis with α = 0.05 revealed that this sample size afforded 
approximately 80% power to detect effect sizes of r = 0.25 (G*Power; 
Faul et al., 2007) for the main effects and interactions between leader 
legitimacy and social control on the dependent variables. The experi-
ment was a 2 (Leader Legitimacy: Legitimate versus Illegitimate) × 2 
(Social Control: Present versus Absent) between- participants design.
6.2 | Procedure
Similar to Study 1, we first measured National identification to as-
sess the condition of a positive social identity as a requirement for 
the transgression credit (e.g., Abrams et al., 2013). This condition is 
also essential for people’s readiness to engage in collective action, 
when they are threatened or treated unjustly (Reicher, 1996; De 
Weerd & Klandermans, 1999). This was followed by a scenario of 
a transgressive leader, which included the Leader Legitimacy and 
Social Control manipulations, both presented through pieces of (fic-
titious) news, and finally followed by all the dependent measures. 
Participants read about Senator Michael Jones who led the U.S. rep-
resentatives on the International Health Committee.
6.2.1 | Leader Legitimacy manipulation
The Leader Legitimacy manipulation was similar to the previous 
study, though now adapted to the 2017 U.S. context.
6.2.2 | Legitimate condition
Senator Michael Jones was recently elected by absolute majority as the 
U.S.'s leading representative of the International Health Committee, 
whose responsibility is to oversee and make vital decisions on health 
policies which, in turn, have a strong impact on Health care of the United 
States. Several co- workers and staff members from the Committee work-
ing under Senator Jones hold him in high regard and have high expec-
tations for his performance. Some of the comments from co- workers 
included: “Michael Jones was a great bet on our part" and "He has shown 
to be very successful on his past work, so we truly believe in him."
Accordingly, a recent poll involving U.S. citizens included comments 
like: "He earned our trust (...) Senator Jones seems to make understand-
able and reasonable decisions" and "We give him credibility due to his 
past, and we know we can count on him."
6.2.3 | Illegitimate condition
Senator Michael Jones was recently appointed by the government as 
the U.S.'s leading representative of the International Health Committee, 
whose responsibility is to oversee and make vital decisions on health poli-
cies which, in turn, have a strong impact on Health care of the United 
States. Several co- workers and staff members from the Committee 
working under Senator Jones do not hold him in high regard and have 
low expectations for his performance. Some of the comments from co- 
workers included: “Michael Jones was a terrible bet on our part" and “He 
has shown to be very unsuccessful on his past work, so we do not believe 
in him at all."
Accordingly, a recent poll involving U.S. citizens included comments 
like: "He did not earn our trust (...) Senator Jones seems to make incom-
prehensible and unreasonable decisions" and "We do not give him credi-
bility due to his past, and we know we cannot count on him."
6.2.4 | Leader transgression induction
Following the Leader Legitimacy manipulation, participants learned 
of some of the leader’s transgressions.
Recently, Senator Jones seems to have taken some “unconventional 
measures” during his mandate. In particular, there were reports stating 
that he has been ignoring some safety measures in U.S. hospitals as he 
considered them as “minor problems.” Also, he has provided a report to 
the Government to support their proposed changes to the pay and sup-
port of hospital work. The report states that to ensure the provision of 
health services for longer hours, in a cost saving way, changes need to 
be made to all hospital worker contracts, increase the number of work 
hours, yet reducing the provision of their overtime pay.
6.2.5 | Social control manipulation
After reading the Leader Legitimacy manipulation, and learning 
about the leader’s transgression, participants read a second piece 
of the newspaper manipulating the presence (or absence) of effec-




legitimacy (MC) Group threat
Formal 
punishment
Legitimate 5.61 (1.12) 4.03 (1.24) 4.23 (1.44) 3.57 (1.29)
Illegitimate 5.72 (1.05) 2.55 (1.16) 5.29 (1.19) 4.30 (1.31)
All conditions 
(Total)
5.67 (1.08) 3.31 (1.41) 4.74 (1.42) 3.93 (1.34)
TA B L E  2   Descriptive statistics 
– Means (Standard Deviations) – per 
condition (Study 1)
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that Senator Jones had been under investigation by the Attorney- 
General due to the “administrative decisions” recently adopted by 
the Senator, speculated as a misuse of public funds. In the Present 
condition, the piece also referred that after an initial investigation, 
the Attorney- General stated that “This case is already brought to 
trial, and the Senator will be prosecuted and judged according to the 
law,” while in the Absent condition, the Attorney- General referred 
that “The Senator will not be prosecuted and brought to court, and 
the case will be dismissed.”
6.3 | Control measures/Manipulation checks
6.3.1 | National identification and 
Perceived legitimacy
These measures were identical to those employed in Study 1, we 
created a National identification mean score (Cronbach’s α = 0.89) 
and a Perceived legitimacy mean score (Cronbach’s α = 0.98).
6.3.2 | Perceived effectiveness of social control 
(Manipulation check)
Participants answered three items (adapted from Pinto et al., 2016) 
to check their perception regarding the group’s effectiveness in 
dealing with the transgressive leader (1 = Completely disagree; 
7 = Completely agree): (1) “I believe in the efficacy of the Attorney 
General to deal with this case”; (2) “The Attorney General’s deci-
sion in dealing with this decision was fair and appropriate”; (3) “The 
course of action taken by the Attorney General was responsible and 
in compliance with its duties.” We used a mean score of the items 
(Cronbach’s α = 0.97).
6.4 | Dependent measures
6.4.1 | Group threat and formal punishment
Participants indicated their opinion about the threatening impact of 
the transgressive leader to the group and their agreement with sev-
eral possible formal punishment reactions to the leader. These items 
were similar (adapted to the U.S. context) to those employed in Study 
1. We used a mean score of the items for Group threat (Cronbach’s α 
= 0.82), and for Formal punishment (Cronbach’s α =. 87).
6.4.2 | Validation of leader’s behavior
In order to assess tolerance regarding the leader’s misconduct, par-
ticipants indicated how much they validated the leader’s behavior 
in four bipolar traits: 1 = Unnecessary, Not valid, Unacceptable and 
Unjustifiable; 7 = Necessary, Very valid, Acceptable and Justifiable. This 
concept was based on Vala et al. (2011)’s research on behavior vali-
dation. We used a mean score of the items (Cronbach’s α = 0.96).
6.4.3 | Negative emotions
We asked participants to indicate how much anger and shame they 
felt regarding the transgressive leader (1 = None; 7 = A lot of). We 
used a mean score of the items (Cronbach’s α = 0.78).
6.4.4 | Collective protest
Finally, participants indicated their agreement (1 = Completely disa-
gree; 7 = Completely agree) with four items measuring intention for 
punitive collective protest toward the leader: (1) “Help organize a pe-
tition to limit Senator Jones’ decisive power within the Committee”; 
(2) “Participate in raising our collective voice demanding Senator 
Jones to be fired from the Committee”; (3) “Participate in an organ-
ized rally to force Senator Jones to be removed from office”; (4) 
“I would campaign on social media to raise awareness regarding 
Senator Jones’ transgressions.” We used a mean score of the items 
(Cronbach’s α = 0.90). These measures were inspired and developed 
to be consistent with the process of collective protest action (based 
on Machado et al., 2011).
7  | RESULTS
Results were analysed with a Leader Legitimacy × Social Control 
ANOVA on all the dependent measures. Tables 3 and 4 provide de-
scriptive statistics and correlations for measures in Study 2.
7.1 | Control measures/Manipulation checks
7.1.1 | National identification
Participants were on average highly identified with the ingroup 
(M = 5.72; SD = 1.17), and this mean was higher than the mid- point 
of the scale (4), t(191) = 20.39, p < .001. There were no differences 
in terms of national identification between experimental conditions, 
all Fs(1,188) ≤ 1, p ≥ .342.
7.1.2 | Perceived legitimacy
There was a significant main effect of Leader Legitimacy, where par-
ticipants perceived greater legitimacy in the Legitimate condition, 
than in the Illegitimate condition, F(1,188) = 405.38, p < .001, ηp
2 = 
0.683. Thus, the Leader Legitimacy manipulation was effective. As 
expected, we found no effect of Social Control, F(1,188) = 2.55 p = 
.112, ηp
2 = 0.013, or interaction, F(1,188) < 1.
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7.1.3 | Perceived effectiveness of social control
Participants perceived formal social control mechanisms as more re-
sponsive to the leader’s transgressive behavior in the Present condi-
tion than in the Absent condition, F(1,188) = 90.88, p < .001, ηp
2 = 
0.326. Thus, the Social Control manipulation was effective. We found 
no effect of Leader Legitimacy, F(1,188) = 2.54, p = .112, ηp
2 = 0.013, 
but we found a significant interaction, F(1,188) = 11.11, p = .001, ηp
2 
= 0.056. Participants perceived the social control to be significantly 
less effective in the Illegitimate- Absent condition, as compared to the 
Legitimate- Absent one, t(96) = 3.24, p = .002, d = 0.66, 95% CI = [0.40, 
1.65] (see Table 4 for means). Although unexpected, these findings sug-
gest that participants’ views on the ineffectiveness of the social control 
mechanisms may have also been influenced by the leader’s legitimacy.
TA B L E  3   Correlations between variables (Study 2)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Leader legitimacy – 
Social control −0.012 – 
National 
identification
0.048 −0.072 – 
Perceived legitimacy 
(MC)
−0.825*** 0.074 −0.001 – 
Perceived 
effectiveness of SC 
(MC)
−0.104 0.551*** 0.150 0.173* – 
Group threat 0.276*** 0.031 −0.020 −0.243** −0.243** – 
Formal punishment 0.262*** 0.081 0.016 −0.305*** −0.148* 0.672*** – 
Validation of leader’s 
behaviour
−0.205** 0.003 0.006 0.319*** 0.236** −0.503*** −0.645*** – 
Negative emotions 0.303*** 0.062 −0.012 −0.295*** −0.184* 0.668*** 0.600*** −0.433*** – 
Collective protest 0.193** 0.009 −0.021 −0.225** −0.152* 0.476*** 0.495*** −0.295*** 0.555***
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
Leader Legitimacy coded: Legitimate = −1; Illegitimate = 1; Social Control coded: Absent = −1; Present = 1.




















5.80 (1.18) 5.67 (1.17) 3.86 (1.59) 4.69 (1.32) 4.77 (1.16) 3.01 (1.53) 4.60 (1.39) 3.99 (1.63)
Legitimate 
× Present
5.53 (1.18) 5.86 (1.19) 5.15 (1.39) 4.93 (1.20) 5.24 (1.24) 2.77 (1.65) 5.03 (1.42) 3.86 (1.61)
Illegitimate 
× Absent
5.80 (1.17) 2.10 (1.04) 2.84 (1.54) 5.52 (1.18) 5.68 (1.24) 2.14 (1.31) 5.69 (1.24) 4.46 (1.78)
Illegitimate 
× Present
5.75 (1.15) 2.46 (1.39) 5.52 (1.18) 5.43 (0.92) 5.59 (0.97) 2.41 (1.45) 5.59 (1.13) 4.68 (1.45)
Legitimate 
(Total)
5.66 (1.18) 5.76 (1.18) 4.50 (1.62) 4.81 (1.26) 5.00 (1.22) 2.89 (1.59) 4.81 (1.42) 3.92 (1.62)
Illegitimate 
(Total)
5.77 (1.15) 2.27 (1.23) 4.13 (1.92) 5.48 (1.06) 5.63 (1.11) 2.27 (1.38) 5.64 (1.18) 4.57 (1.63)
Absent 
(Total)
5.80 (1.17) 3.96 (2.11) 3.37 (1.64) 5.09 (1.31) 5.21 (1.28) 2.59 (1.49) 5.12 (1.42) 4.21 (1.72)
Present 
(Total)




5.72 (1.17) 4.11 (2.12) 4.33 (1.77) 5.13 (1.21) 5.30 (1.21) 2.60 (1.52) 5.21 (1.37) 4.23 (1.65)
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7.2 | Dependent measures
7.2.1 | Group threat
As predicted, the analysis of variance showed a significant effect of 
Leader Legitimacy, indicating that participants perceived the illegiti-
mate transgressive leader to be more threatening to the group than 
the legitimate transgressive leader, F(1,188) = 15.48, p < .001, ηp
2 = 
0.076. There was no significant effect of Social Control or interac-
tion, Fs(1,188) ≤ 1.
7.2.2 | Formal punishment
As predicted, participants agreed that the transgressive illegitimate 
leader should be punished more severely than the transgressive le-
gitimate leader, F(1,188) = 13.96, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.069. There was no 
significant effect of Social Control, F(1,188) = 1.24, p = .268, ηp
2 = 
0.007, or interaction, F(1,188) = 2.72, p = .101, ηp
2 = 0.014.
7.2.3 | Validation of leader’s behavior
As predicted, participants perceived the leader’s behavior as more 
valid when the transgressive leader was legitimate than when he was 
illegitimate, F(1,188) = 8.14, p = .005, ηp
2 = 0.041. We found no ef-




As predicted, participants reported significantly more anger and 
shame when the transgressive leader was perceived as illegitimate 
as opposed to legitimate, F(1,188) = 19.13, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.092. 
There was no significant effect of Social Control, F < 1, or interac-
tion, F(1,188) = 1.98, p = .161, ηp
2 = 0.010.
7.2.5 | Collective protest
As predicted, participants agreed more with collective protest in the 
Illegitimate condition, than in the Legitimate condition, F(1,188) = 
7.64, p = .006, ηp
2 = 0.039. There was no significant effect of Social 
Control or interaction, Fs(1,188) < 1.
7.3 | Mediation analysis
Considering that Social Control did not show a main effect or signif-
icant correlations with the dependent variables (r ≤ 0.062, p ≥. 392), 
we proceeded with our hypothesized mediation analysis. As such, 
we tested a sequential mediation model in which Leader Legitimacy 
(Legitimate = −1 and Illegitimate = 1) is associated with higher levels 
of Group threat, which in turn is associated with Negative emotions 
and, finally, with agreement with Collective protest. The Pearson’s 
product- moment correlations between all measures were all sig-
nificant (r ≥ 0.196, p ≤ .006). We proceeded to a sequential media-
tion analysis (Model 6, with 10,000 bootstraps; see Hayes, 2013) 
to test our prediction (see Figure 1). The total model significantly 
explained Collective protest, F(3, 188) = 30.60, p < .001, account-
ing for 32.81% of the variance. In line with our prediction, Group 
threat and Negative emotions significantly sequentially mediated 
the association between Leader Legitimacy and Collective protest: 
total indirect effect: b = 0.30, SE = 0.07, 95% CI = [0.16, 0.45]; total 
effect: b = 0.32, SE = 0.12, t = 2.76, p = .006, 95% CI = [0.09, 0.55]; 
direct effect: b = 0.03, SE = 0.10, t = 0.25, p = .806, 95% CI = 
[−0.18, 0.23]. In sum, the model shows that participants perceived 
the transgressive illegitimate leader as more threatening, and the 
more threatening the leader was perceived to be, the more anger 
and shame participants felt and, consequently, the stronger agree-
ment with collective protest toward the leader. Conversely, the le-
gitimate leader triggered less group threat, which was associated 
with less anger and shame, which in turn were associated with less 
willingness to engage in collective protest toward the legitimate 
leader.
F I G U R E  1   The mediating effect of Group threat and Negative emotions on the association between Leader Legitimacy and Collective 
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7.4 | DISCUSSION
Overall, Study 2 provides further support to the idea that a leader’s 
perceived (il)legitimacy determines how threatening the group per-
ceives the leader’s transgression to be, and, consequently, the extent 
to which participants agree with the implementation of formal puni-
tive measures. Study 2 also extends previous findings, by showing 
that illegitimate leaders obtain less validation from group members, 
trigger more negative emotions and higher agreement with collec-
tive protest, compared to a transgressive legitimate leader. In sum, 
Study 2 found that only legitimate leaders are awarded transgression 
credit, and that they gather more validation for their decisions than 
illegitimate leaders do. Moreover, results also show that anger and 
shame (triggered by the threat posed by a transgressive illegitimate 
leader) are associated with increased willingness to engage in puni-
tive collective protest aiming at removing the transgressive leader 
from the leadership role. In contrast, transgressive legitimate leaders 
were perceived as less threatening to the group, which resulted in a 
lower negative emotional state, and a relatively tolerant response 
from the group.
Additionally, Study 2 also tested the idea that participants view 
the group’s social control inaction toward a transgressive leader as 
an acceptable reaction, if they perceive such leader as legitimate. In 
this sense, we found that legitimate leaders that engaged in trans-
gressive behavior still benefit from transgression credit, even when 
it became clear that such leaders would not suffer consequences for 
their misconduct. Indeed, even in the absence of formal social control 
mechanisms, followers reacted more favorably toward transgressive 
legitimate leaders, compared to illegitimate leaders. Interestingly, 
we observed that in the absence of social control, participants per-
ceived social control as less ineffective in controlling transgressive 
behavior from legitimate leaders, compared to illegitimate ones. This 
finding could be partly accounted by the influence that leader le-
gitimacy can have on people’s perceptions, and it could potentially 
explain why people at times seem indifferent toward transgressive 
leaders who go unpunished.
8  | GENER AL DISCUSSION
Both studies consistently showed that leader legitimacy is key in de-
termining either favorable or unfavorable reactions toward a trans-
gressive leader. A transgressive legitimate leader came across as less 
threatening to the ingroup and was more tolerated than a transgres-
sive illegitimate leader. Study 1 demonstrated that punitive reac-
tions to transgressive leaders were higher when they were perceived 
as illegitimate by their followers, as compared to legitimate leaders. 
In contrast, the transgressive legitimate leader was perceived as 
less threatening and raised less agreement with formal punishment 
measures (transgression credit), than the illegitimate leader. These 
results clarify the transgression credit given to leaders (Abrams 
et al., 2013), by showing that legitimate (but not illegitimate) leaders 
are considered worthy of the “benefit of the doubt” and forgiven 
for their transgressive behavior. Consequently, leader legitimacy al-
lowed for greater transgression because followers abdicated moral 
authority to their leaders.
Study 2 showed that transgressive illegitimate leaders received 
less validation for their actions, raised feelings of anger and shame 
among group members and gathered higher agreement with collec-
tive protest. Specifically, the threat caused by illegitimate leaders 
triggered negative emotions that acted as fuel for collective actions 
to remove such leaders from their role. Considering the implications 
of an absence of leadership in groups, it is interesting to find that 
groups prefer to remove their leader (and become leaderless until 
a replacement is found), than accepting transgressive illegitimate 
leadership. Moreover, initial acknowledgment of leaders acts as a 
buffer for transgressive behavior, possibly giving such leaders a high 
degree of leniency for misconduct (Abrams et al., 2013; Randsley de 
Moura & Abrams, 2013). Furthermore, participants’ reactions were 
fundamentally dependent on whether the leader was legitimate or 
not, even when presented with different outcomes of social control 
(i.e., the leader was facing punishment or would remain unpunished 
by authorities). Interestingly, in the absence of social control mecha-
nisms, individuals showed more distrust in the group’s social control 
system when the transgressive leader was perceived as illegitimate. 
In a sense, once deemed illegitimate, leaders’ actions might be more 
easily perceived as transgressive. Future research could further ex-
plore whether people’s opinions on the effectiveness of the justice 
system are influenced by the leader’s legitimacy.
8.1 | Theoretical and applied implications
Results suggest that group members rely on a leader’s (il)legitimacy 
in order to decide how to interpret the transgression, and conse-
quently, how to react. These data shed light on why some leaders are 
pressured to resign from their position after their misconducts be-
come public, while others are allowed to remain in office. In fact, our 
results show that disinvestment from the group (Pinto et al., 2016) 
may not be the only reaction group members adopt. Alternative re-
sponses such as tolerance (and validation/ acceptance) of the trans-
gression behavior or informal punitive reactions can be implemented 
toward the transgressors. Future research could consider the impact 
that these responses have on commitment to the group and on 
group cohesion.
The current paper provides novel insights into the drivers of tol-
erance for transgressive leaders, but its findings also have important 
applied implications. Ensuring an ethical environment is of impor-
tance for many organizations and promoting ethical conduct is key 
to effective corporate governance (Jamali et al., 2008). This is espe-
cially relevant, given that leaders have a key role in shaping ethical 
organizational culture (Ciulla, 1998; Freeman et al., 1988; Treviño, 
1990) and are likely to modulate their followers’ behavior (Brown 
et al., 2005). In fact, our studies suggest that judgments of uneth-
ical leaders seem to depend more on how legitimate leaders are 
perceived to be than their actual behavior. Indeed, demonstrations 
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across several countries are filled with social frustration toward their 
countries’ leaders; some of them are even violent in requesting for 
leaders’ resignation. The current European socioeconomic crisis 
weighs heavily on the people, and in many countries, leaders appear 
to be failing in restoring common well- being. Such failure may deem 
leaders as illegitimate, for not being competent or motivated enough, 
by failing to meet the promises made, and therefore, losing credibil-
ity among the people. These leaders are ultimately seen through a 
filter of negative expectations that can easily unchain perceptions 
that these leaders’ behaviors are less valid, while triggering punitive 
collective attitudes toward them, namely claiming for their removal.
The presented manipulation of legitimacy consisted in two parts: 
(1) leader emergence (or selection by employees/peers) versus 
leader appointment and the granting of leadership; (2) Combination 
of positive (versus negative) traits and interactions with the group. 
Although previous research has equated leader selection by peers 
with granting of leadership (Ben- Yoav et al., 1983; Hollander & 
Julian, 1970; Julian et al., 1969), in most workplaces, leaders are 
appointed and not elected. In fact, the notion that a president of a 
company was elected by employees or peers is unrealistic. Naturally, 
leaders can be appointed, and still be granted leadership. Because 
of this, we adjusted our scenarios to more public organizations in an 
attempt to create a more realistic scenario. Nevertheless, we argue 
that the process behind leader selection is not the only factor con-
tributing to one’s legitimacy. That is, in an attempt to pin down the 
factor of leader legitimacy, we focused on positive impressions/in-
teractions between the leader and “other group members” (Phillips 
et al., 2009), along with other relevant traits, such as trust and com-
petence (Hollander, 2009; Julian et al., 1969; Shapiro et al., 2011). In 
fact, even the manipulation check of leader legitimacy might con-
flate perceptions of purely trust and perceptions legitimacy (grant-
ing of leadership). While related, they are not necessarily the same. 
In that regard, the concept of leader legitimacy might share similar-
ities with other relevant concepts in leadership research. Future re-
search should focus on a more detailed conceptualization to explore 
these differences.
In the present research we used experimental vignettes, as this 
has been shown to be a valid and appropriate method (e.g., Aguinis 
& Bradley, 2014), and is a mechanism which allows to test research 
questions that might pose ethical complexities in typical organiza-
tional research methods (e.g., manipulating leader transgression in 
a real organizational context would not be possible). Furthermore, 
this research was conducted in two different countries (Portugal and 
the United Kingdom), and consistently showed the legitimacy effect. 
Nonetheless, future research could extend the generalizability of 
these findings using alternative methods (e.g., longitudinal surveys, 
particularly when considering the role of perceived leader legitimacy 
as a predictor of socially relevant outcomes), varied normative con-
texts and settings (e.g., politics, organizations, sports).
In summary, leader legitimacy seems to be essential to account 
for reactions to transgressive leaders, as legitimate leaders are given 
more credit for moral transgressions. In a sense, the group seems to 
enter a validation process of the leader’s misconduct, as legitimate 
leaders are perceived to have earned the right to lead and, thus, de-
serve a “second chance.” Above all, it seems that a leader’s formal 
role is not the only aspect that defines their power, as leadership 
seems to be of little use without the group’s acknowledgment and 
validation of the leader’s legitimacy.
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